2.3 AUG 1984

Memorandum for the Record

Discussion Points Concerning the Director of Security's Testimony on Polygraph

The following points might deserve some discussion and consideration in connection with the Director of Security's proposed testimony in September 1984 before the House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee:

*Open Hearings: We took the strong position with the Office of Technology Assessment in September 1983 that it would be extremely difficult to properly present our data in an unclassified forum, but we would testify in closed hearings. Our letter to the Congressional unit is signed by Clair George, who is now DDO.

February 1984 Testimony: The Director of Security's February 1984 testimony goes about 20 pages and is classified Secret. The proposed September 1984 testimony is almost a carbon copy in terms of fifteen pages, is readily recognized as the same polygraph "speech", and is presented as unclassified. I think we stand a chance of being criticized for being wrong and/or inconsistent with Congressional committees and OTA.

Previous Testimony on Polygraph: Messrs and testified concerning aspects of the polygraph program, and this unclassified material is readily available for review. My sense of this is that they all defended the utility of the program in a broad general sense, but they did not go into specifics, with statistics, numbers of disapprovals, categories of cases, etc.. I don't know about sources, but there is a lot on "methods"

The DDO and CI Staff: I believe that earlier focus of attention on polygraph some years ago focused on staff screening, whereas this presentation also addresses operational cases on a worldwide basis, as well as the repolygraph program. I do have a concern that Clair George have a chance to review the proposed testimony, to be sure that it does not give aid and comfort to foreign intelligence services. At a time when the Office of Security is focusing so much time and attention on "leaks", I think we need to take a particularly cautious and conservative approach to be sure we are not accused of a security indiscretion.

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